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Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative
Institutional Analysis
TIMOTHY D. LYTrON"
I. INTRODUCTION
The current wave of lawsuits against the gun industry is part of a na-
tionwide debate over how to reduce gun violence. Proponents of these
lawsuits view litigation as a way to promote controversial proposals aimed
at reducing gun violence, such as making manufacturers responsible for
supervising retail gun sales and forcing them to install safety features that
would render guns inoperable in the hands of unauthorized users.' To op-
ponents, these proposals would unfairly burden gun manufacturers and
could make it harder for law-abiding citizens to use guns for self-defense?
Lawsuits against the gun industry are also part of another debate over
the proper role of the tort system in the process of making public policy.
Proponents of the suits argue that litigation is a legitimate way to regulate a
powerful industry whose lobbying efforts have distorted the legislative
process? Opponents counter that policymaking ought to be left to legisla-
* Associate Professor, New York Law School (Albany Law School beginning July 1, 2000). B.A.
1987, J.D. 1991, Yale University. I would like to thank thefolloulngpeoplefor dir generous help on
this project: Rachel Anisfe14 Peter Berkowtz, David Bernsten, Theresa Boddle, Paul Hotaling Grace
Lee, Judith Miller, Peter Schuc Tony Sebok and Wendy Wagner. Comments may be sent via email to
tlyttoncompuserwcom.
1. Several lawsuits recently filed against gun manufacturers demand manufact supervision of
retail gun sales. See, e.g., Complaint at A-C, NAACP v. A.A. Arns Inc., No. 99 C.V. 3999
(E.D.N.Y. filed July 16, 1999); see also Brian Siebel, City Lawrutts Against the Gun Industiy: A
Roadmap for Reforming Another Deadly Indusry, 18 ST. LOUIS U. Pun. L REV. at Part IV.B (forth-
coming 2000). Other lawsuits seek compulsory installation of safety features. e mg., Complaint
(Award) at 4(h), City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98 CH 15596 (m11. Cir. CL Cook
County filed Nov. 12, 1998); Jonathan Lowy, Litigating Gun Violence Cases: Liability for Design
Defects 2-3 (1999) (unpublished manuscript, presented at ABA conference on Gun Violence Liability,
June 4, 1999, on file with the author).
2. See Charleton Heston, The President's Column, AMERICAN RIFLMAN, June 1999, at 12; Gary
Kleck, Guns Aren't Ready to be Smart, N.Y. TIES, Mar. 11, 2000, at AIS [hereinafter Kleck, Guns
Aren't Ready].
3. See Andrew Jay McClur, Strict Liabil/ for Handgun A wfacturear: A Reply to Professor
Olier, 14 U. ARK. LIrlERoCIKLJ. 511,516-17 (1992).
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tures and that plaintiffs are using litigation as a way to circumvent the leg-
islative process.4
These debates involve two different kinds of questions, one about the
best policy to reduce gun violence, the other about which institution should
make that choice. This article addresses the question of institutional
choice. I argue that the tort system can complement the efforts of other
institutions such as markets, legislatures and administrative agencies to
make public policy. Solving complex social problems typically requires
the cooperation of several policymaking institutions, each with its own
strengths and weaknesses. My examination of lawsuits against the gun
industry reveals that the tort system can and should play an active policy-
making role in reducing gun violence.
I support this claim using comparative institutional analysis, identify-
ing the strengths and weaknesses of different policymaking institutions and
showing how the tort system can overcome the limitations of other institu-
tions.5 Comparative institutional analysis justifies policymaking through
litigation when even a flawed tort system can regulate better than markets,
legislatures and administrative agencies.
My claim challenges two extreme positions that now dominate debate
over the proper role of the tort system in policymaking. On one hand, I
reject the view that the failure of legislatures to enact tougher gun control
laws reveals that they "have abdicated their responsibility in this area,"
leaving courts free "to act on their own."6 The refusal of a legislature to
adopt new restrictions following robust legislative debate should guide
judicial policymaking efforts. I advocate a secondary role for the tort sys-
tem in policymaking, one that complements legislative efforts. On the
other hand, I reject the view that only legislatures are well suited to poli-
cymaking and that courts should merely resolve individual disputes. 7 Tort
adjudication has always had public policy implications, and I argue that
courts should carefully attend to these implications when adjudicating
claims against the gun industry.
The tort system is an imperfect policymaking institution, but it can en-
hance the policymaking process. Legislatures can make better policy with
4. See Phillip D. Oliver, Rejecting the "Whipping-Boy" Approach to Tort Law: Well.Made Hand-
gunsAre Not Defective Products, 14 U. ARK. LIrLE RocK LJ. 1, 5 (1991).
5. My use of comparative institutional analysis owes much to Neil Komesar and Peter Schuck.
See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMWERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1994) (describing comparative institutional analysis as the way we
chose to allocate authority among decision making processes and institutions within society); PETER
ScHruCK, THE LIMrrs OF LAw: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 424 (2000) (arguing that com-
parative institutional analysis is essential to evaluating the effectiveness of regulation) (hereinafter
SCHUCK, LIMrTs OF LAw].
6. McClurg, supra note 3, at 519.
7. See Anne Giddings Kimball & Sarah L. Olson, Municipal Firearm Litigation: 11 Conceived
From AnyAngle, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1277 (2000).
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the help of courts. While this Article advocates a complementary role for
the tort system, it provides merely an outline for an argument that would do
justice to the enormous complexity of this topic. I hope, however, that
despite its limitations, the Article will raise important challenges to both
unrestrained enthusiasm for and uncompromising opposition to gun litiga-
tion.
In Part II of the Article, I advocate a complementary role for the tort
system in policymaking by showing how the tort system can remedy cer-
tain deficiencies of other institutions seeking to reduce gun violence. In
Part III, I analyze how the tort system influences public policy. I begin by
describing two specific policy proposals at issue in lawsuits against the gun
industry. Next, I examine how the actions of parties, judges and juries
influence the success of these proposals. Finally, I discuss the dangers of
relying too heavily on the tort system to make policy. In Part IV, I explore
how legislatures and courts limit the policymaking powers of the tort sys-
tem.
II. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF A COMPLEMENTARY ROLE FOR THE TORT
SYSTEM IN POLICYMAKING
Public policy is typically produced by the overlapping efforts of differ-
ent institutions. Markets, legislatures, administrative agencies, and the tort
system all have different strengths and weaknesses; one's advantages can
compensate for another's shortcomings. I will advocate a complimentary
policymaking role for the tort system by showing that it compensates for
the shortcomings of other institutions. These shortcomings are: market
failure, legislative bias, gaps in prospective regulation, agency capture, and
limited enforcement resources.
A. Marketfailure
One institution that makes gun-violence policy is the market. A cardi-
nal virtue of markets is their capacity to promote beneficial products and
behaviors, and discourage detrimental ones. Consumers' willingness to
pay for goods and services encourages their production. Conversely, con-
sumers' refusal to purchase goods and services eliminates them. In a well-
functioning market, consumer demand determines whether the benefits of a
particular product or behavior outweigh its costs. However, where con-
sumers do not bear the full costs and benefits of a product or behavior,
consumer demand is no longer a reliable indicator of whether the benefits
of a product or behavior outweigh its costs. This can occur when the price
of the product or service does not reflect its true costs or when individuals
other than the consumer enjoy its benefits. Economists call these kinds of
market failures externalities.
The gun market suffers from externalities. Many of the costs and
benefits of gun ownership are not borne by consumers. On one hand, the
costs of gun violence fall heavily on victims who are not themselves gun
consumers.9 On the other hand, the deterrence benefits of widespread pri-
vate gun ownership may accrue to those who do not own guns."D These
externalities make the failure of the market to promote gun-manufacturer
supervision of retail sales or installation of safety features a poor indicator
of whether either of them would be, on balance, beneficial. If one is seek-
ing cost effective measures to reduce gun violence, then one ought not rely
exclusively on the gun market as currently constituted.
The tort system can help to overcome some externalities. By making
gun manufacturers liable for gun violence that results from their failure to
supervise retail sales or to install safety features, the tort system can inter-
nalize some of the costs of gun ownership currently borne by gunshot vic-
tims. Tort liability would provide manufacturers with an incentive to adopt
precautionary marketing practices or safer designs whenever these cost less
than the gun-violence liability costs that they prevent.
The choice to impose the costs of gun violence on gun manufacturers,
however, is not so clear. If the same reduction in gun violence could be
achieved at lower cost by someone else, such as retail dealers, consumers,
or the government, then from an economic point of view it would be pref-
erable to internalize the cost to that party by making them liable. Either
way, the tort system provides one way to internalize some gun violence
costs by imposing liability on the cheapest cost avoider."
8. See generally, R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (providing
examples of actions of firms that have harmful effects on others).
9. A recent study estimated that 134,445 gunshot injuries in the United States in 1994 produced
$2.3 billion in lifetime medical costs of which half was paid by taxpayers. This figure does not Include
the additional costs generated by the approximately 39,000 fatalities in that year. See Philip Cook, et
al., The Medical Costs of Gunshot Injuries in the United States, 282 JAMA 447, 447 (1999).
10. Existing studies on the self-defense benefits of guns estimate between 64,000 and 3.4 million
defensive gun uses each year. See GARY KLECic, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL
147-89 (1997) [hereinafter KLEcy, TARGETING GUNS]. Additionally, a potential criminal may be
deterred merely by the fear of encountering an armed victim, meaning that the widespread private
ownership of guns may deter crimes against even unarmed victims. See JOHN R. Lor, JR., MORE
GUNS, LEss CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRVME AND GUN-CONTROL LAWS 5 (1998).
11. See generally GUIDO CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 174 (1970) (discussing society's goal of placing liability on the cheapest and best cost avoi-
der). In practice, tort liability internalizes only some of the costs borne by victims since it pays com-
pensation only to those victims who successfully bring suit for injuries caused by negligent defendants
or defective products. In addition, the tort system does nothing to address the remaining externalization
of the benefits of gun ownership.
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B. Legislative bias
Another institution that makes gun-violence policy is the legislature.'
2
Ideally, legislative regulation enjoys a special status as a highly democratic
method of policymaking. The decisions of a well-functioning legislature,
even when they produce inefficient policies, still represent the will of a
majority of legislators who fairly represent the interests of their constitu-
ents. In practice, however, the legislative process can be biased in favor of
well organized minority interests. This bias can undermine the democratic
legitiniacy of legislative policymaking.
There is some evidence that the gun industry and the National Rifle
Association ("NRA") represent a well organized minority interest that has
defeated proposals to reduce gun violence that a majority of Americans
support. Nationwide surveys conducted in 1996 and 1998 revealed major-
ity support for laws that would restrict qualified purchasers to one gun per
month and that would compel manufacturers to install locking devices in
all new handguns; both measures were successfully opposed in Congress
by the industry and the NRA.1
3
Allegations of pro-gun industry bias in the legislative process are
strengthened by the structure of gun control politics. 4 On one hand, it is
relatively easy to organize pro-industry lobbying efforts since additional
regulation would mean very high costs to the small number of firms in the
industry. The benefits to members of this group from lobbying efforts op-
posing gun industry regulation are high and concentrated within a small
group. On the other hand, it is relatively hard to organize gun-control lob-
bying efforts since, while the overall costs of suffering gun violence are
high, the risk to any one individual is quite low. The benefits to members
of the public of lobbying efforts in favor of gun industry regulation are low
and dispersed among a very large group.
The tort system provides an alternative forum for policy debate when
powerful interests have squelched legislative discussion. The tort system
also provides a decision making process that is largely insulated from the
influence of powerful lobbies. In the tort system, parties, despite differ-
ences in the amount of resources that they can invest in litigation, are
12. Congress and state assemblies have traditionally attempted to reduce gun violence mithout
eliminating the crime deterrence benefits of widespread private gun ownership by means of statutes
regulating the sale and possession of fireams.m See generally BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBAcCO &
FIREARMS, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FEDERAL FIREARmS REGULATIONs REFERENCE GuIDm (1995)
(detailing the federal statutes regulating firearms); BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, & FtREAR?%ts,
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, STATE LAWS AND PUBLISHED ORDINcEs-FtREAmiS (1998) (detailing
state laws and ordinances placing restrictions on the sale and possession of firearms).
13. See Stephen P. Teret, et. al., Support for New Policies to Regulate Fireams: Results of Two
NationalSurveys, 339 NEWENG. J. MED. 813 (1998).
14. My analysis of the structure of gun control politics draws on the work of Neil Komesar. See
generally KOmESAR, supra note 5, at 53-97 (discussing the political process and the balance between
the power of the few and the power of the many).
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granted equal access to decision makers. Judges, especially those who do
not stand for election, and jurors are less likely than legislators to be influ-
enced by the political power of litigants.
Having suggested that policymaking by means of tort litigation offers a
solution to the problem of legislative bias, I do not wish to dismiss the gun
industry and its allies as no more than a special interest group that has cor-
rupted the legislative policymaking process. To its credit, the industry has
successfully opposed measures to ban guns that are opposed by a majority
of Americans.' 5 In these situations, the gun industry might rightly be
viewed as a public interest advocacy group. Furthermore, the lobbying
activities of gun-control organizations such as the Center to Prevent Hand-
gun Violence and the Violence Policy Center could equally be viewed as
either special interest or public interest efforts. Indeed, both sides in the
gun-violence policy debate have sought to portray themselves as defenders
of the public interest while casting their opponents as narrowly self-
interested special interest lobbies.16 For the purposes of the comparative
institutional analysis presented in this Article, I wish to suggest only that
there is some evidence that gun industry lobbying efforts have introduced
bias into the legislative policymaking process with regard to the specific
areas of industry marketing practices and development of safer gun de-
signs.
C. Gaps in prospective regulation
In addition to bias, another problem with legislative policymaking
arises out of an inherent limitation of prospective rulemaking. Legislatures
promulgate rules that regulate conduct. In making these rules, legislatures
cannot possibly anticipate all situations, and so the rules inevitably fail to
cover conduct that the legislature would have wanted to regulate if it had
contemplated the conduct.
The tort system offers a way to fill in the gaps that remain in legislative
regulation. Holding gun manufacturers liable for unreasonable marketing
practices gives gun manufacturers an incentive to stay well within the letter
of the law rather than looking for ways around it. For example, while ex-
tensive federal and state regulations restrict the interstate sale of "fire-
arms", 7 at least one gun manufacturer has marketed its weapons in the
form of "firearms parts kits" in order to avoid these restrictions.' 8 The
15. See KLEcK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 10, at 337.
16. This is a common strategy among interest groups in American political debate. See ScHucK,
LIMITS OF LAW, supra note 5, at 212.
17. See generally Commerce in Firearms and Ammunition, 27 C.F.R § 178 (1999) (detailing the
extensive limits state and federal government has placed on the sale of firearms).
18. See Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 5-7, Halberstam v. Daniel, No. 95
Civ. 3323 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); see also Timothy D. Lytton, Halberstam v. Daniel and the Uncertain
Future of Negligent Marketing Claims Against Firearms Manufacturers, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 681, 686-
87(1998).
[Vol. 32:1247
A COPAR74TIVENST77I7ONALANALM1S
manufacturer legally sold its semi-automatic pistols through the mail with-
out keeping any transaction records or conducting any background checks
on purchasers, both of which are required for the sale of "firearms." 1' 9 As
the result of a lawsuit against this manufacturer, no manufacturer currently
avoids record keeping and background check requirements by selling guns
in the form of parts kits.
D. Administrative capture
Administrative agencies are a third type of institution that makes gun-
violence policy. Legislatures often delegate power to administrative agen-
cies, allowing the agencies to transform general rules into a practical and
nuanced set of regulations. Administrative agencies provide expertise,
attention to individual cases, and enforcement resources that support legis-
lative regulatory efforts. Ideally, administrative agencies are impartial
executors of legislative mandates. In practice, however, a powerful indus-
try can exert significant influence over the agencies that are created to gov-
em it. Agency capture can defeat a legislature's attempts to regulate an
industry.
Agency capture interferes with regulation of the gun industry. For
example, decades of criticism by the gun industry and the NRA have made
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF"), the federal
agency responsible for promulgating and enforcing firearms regulations,
reluctant to publish information unfavorable to gun manufacturers.20 In-
stead, the agency's criticisms have been limited to irresponsible dealers?'
The tort system is not subject to this problem of agency capture. In
contrast to agency officials, tort plaintiffs have the incentive and the power
(through discovery) to uncover damaging industry information that may
help to produce better informed policy choices. Tort plaintiffs are more
likely to dig deeper and more persistently into the highly secretive gun
industry than any government regulatory agency.2 2
E. Limited enforcement resources
A second difficulty encountered by administrative agencies is lack of
resources. BATF regulation of the gun industry is severely limited by the
paucity of agency resources compared to the extent of industry activity. In
1997, BATF agents were able to make on-site inspections to only 13,000 of
19. See Lytton, supra note 18, at 695.
20. See TOM DIAZ, MAKING A KILLING: THE BUSINESS OF GUNS IN AMERICA 6-7 (1999); see also
Fox Butterfield, Limits on Power and eal Hamper Firearms Agency, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1999, at Al
[hereinafter Butterfield, Limits on Power].
21. See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS, DEP'T OF TH TREASURY, ATF CRIME
GuN TRACE ANALYSIS REPORr. YOUTH CRIME INTIcnON INmAT _E THE ILLMAL YoutH
FIREARMS MARKErS iN 27 CoMNmImES 1 (1999); BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND IEARms,
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GUN SHOWS: BRADY CHECKS AND CIME GUN TRACES 2-3,20 (1999).
22. See DIAz szpra note 20, at 5.
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the approximately 100,000 federally licensed firearms dealers.23 The threat
of tort liability provides incentives for the industry to police itself, without
the expense of on-site inspections.
To summarize, I have advocated a policymaking role for the tort sys-
tem by showing how it complements the policymaking efforts of markets,
legislatures, and administrative agencies. The tort system provides solu-
tions to common problems faced by these other institutions. It alleviates
market failures due to externalities, counteracts the effects of legislative
bias, fills gaps in prospective regulation, circumvents the obstacles posed
by agency capture, and supplements limited enforcement resources. For all
of these reasons, the tort system should play an active and supportive poli-
cymaking role in current efforts to reduce gun violence.
HI. How THE TORT SYSTEM MAKES GUN-VIOLENCE POLICY
Having advocated a complementary policymaking role for the tort
system, I turn now to examining how the tort system makes gun-violence
policy. I begin by outlining two specific policy proposals at issue in law-
suits against the gun industry. Next, I describe the doctrinal theories that
allowed plaintiffs to seek adoption of these proposals by means of tort liti-
gation. I then analyze how different players in the tort system-parties,
judges, and juries-have contributed to making gun-violence policy. At
several points in the discussion, I caution against over-reliance on the tort
system, pointing out the pitfalls of expanding the policymaking role of the
tort system beyond merely complementing the efforts of other institutions.
A. Two policy proposals
Plaintiffs in lawsuits against the gun industry have explicitly stated in
pleadings and press conferences that the primary aim of their litigation
efforts is to promote public policies that will reduce gun violence. For
example, in a class action lawsuit recently filed by the NAACP against
more than one-hundred gun manufacturers, the complaint begins by stating
that: "Plaintiff... brings this action for equitable relief against the defen-
dants seeking changes in the marketing, distribution and sales practices of
the defendants-practices which have led to disproportionate numbers of
injuries, deaths and other damages among those whose interests the plain-
tiff represents. 24 The lead plaintiff in a lawsuit brought by seven mothers
23. See id at 43; see also Robert J. Spitzer, Letter to the Editor, Enforcing Gun Laws, N.Y. TIMES,
July 24, 1999, at A14 (asserting that the DEA's budget has risen much faster than the BATF's); Butter-
field, Limits on Power, supra note 20 (discussing the BATF's poor resources as compared to that of the
DEA). But see Clinton Seeks New Spending to Enforce Laws on Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2000, at
A16 (reporting new efforts to increase BATF enforcement resources).
24. Complaint at 1, NAACP v. AA. Arms, Inc., No. 99 C.V. 3999 (E.D.N.Y. filed July 16,
1999).
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of shooting victims against twenty-five gun manufacturers, explained her
motivations for suing: "Nothing can bring my son back, nothing. And
there can't be a price for his life. So the case is really not about that. It's
about changing what's been happening right now in terms of the flow of
guns into our communities."25
Shooting victims have been suing gun manufacturers for their injuries
since the early 1900s.26 Until recently, victims recovered only for acci-
dental shootings where the gun malfunctioned in some way, such as firing
unexpectedly27 By contrast, the current wave of lawsuits against the gun
industry seeks not merely to hold individual manufacturers liable for faulty
weapons, but to change the way the whole industry designs and sells guns.
I focus here on two specific policies proposed by plaintiffs: manufac-
turer supervision of retail gun sales and compulsory installation of safety
features. I do not present these two proposals in order to evaluate whether
they would be fair and effective ways to reduce gun violence. Rather, I
introduce them in order to analyze how the tort system makes that determi-
nation.
1. Manufacturer supervision of retail gun sales
Plaintiffs allege that manufacturer supervision of retail gun dealers
would decrease sales to individuals who pose a high risk of criminal mis-
use, such as those with convictions for violent crime.s Gun manufacturers
currently have no legal obligation to supervise the activities of retail deal-
ers. Illegal sales at the retail level are quite common.9 In addition to
making illegal sales, dealers also sell guns to qualified purchasers who buy
them for disqualified individuals, a transaction known as a straw
purchase2 °
There is reason to believe that manufacturers could identify irresponsi-
ble dealers using readily available information. Federal law enforcement
25. NPR Morning Edition: Jurors 9711 Begin Deliberation in a Case that Pits Guntakers Against
Victims of Gun Violence VWho Feel the Manufacturers are Responsible (National Public Radio broand-
cast, Feb. 4, 1999).
26. See WINDLE TURLEY & JAMES E. ROOKS, JR., FIREAM S LrGATTON: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
PRACTICE 150 (1988).
27. See generally Bender v. Colt Industries, Inc., 517 S.W.2d 705 (Mo. Ct App. 1974) (gun dis-
charged when fell out of buyer's pocket onto concrete platform); Sturm Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.7d
38 (Alaska 1979) (gun discharged when buyer grabbed gun as it dropped out of his hand while un-
loading it); Cobb v. Insured Lloyds, 387 So. 2d 13 (La. App. 1980) (gun accidentally discharged while
located underneath the seat of a moving car).
28. See Siebel, supra note 1, at Part IV.B.
29. See Complaint at 22-36, City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 99-2518 011. Cir. CL
Cook County filed Nov. 12, 1998) (providing evidence of the frequency of illegal gun sales by retail
dealers); Complaint at 1 77-83, Wayne County v. Arms Technology, No. 99-73056 (EiD. Mi ch. filed
Jul. 15, 1999).
30. See Julius Wachtel, Sources of Crime Guns in Los Angele4 California, 21 POLICING: AN INr'L
J. OFPOuCE STRATEGIES & MG?.T., 220, 233-37(1998).
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statistics reveal that a small number of dealers are the source of a high per-
centage of guns that are used in crime.3 1 A recent study of this data con-
cluded that a mere one-hundred and thirty-seven gun stores sold 13,000
guns traced to crimes in 1998, and that these same one-hundred and thirty-
seven stores sold more than 34,631 guns traced to crimes between 1996
and 1998.32 Each of these dealers was the source of at least fifty guns
traced to crimes in 1998, and two of them each sold over one-thousand
guns traced to crimes in that year.3
Plaintiffs have suggested several specific measures that would enable
gun manufacturers to supervise retail sales and weed out rogue dealers.34
First, plaintiffs have proposed that manufacturers promulgate retail sales
practices and train dealers to identify disqualified individuals and straw
purchasers.35  Second, plaintiffs have suggested that manufacturers sell
only through franchised retail outlets in order to ensure greater control over
sales activities.36 Third, plaintiffs have demanded that manufacturers ref-
use to supply dealers who have sold a disproportionate number of guns
traced to crimes.
37
For their part, defendants have expressed support for reducing illegal
sales and weeding out rogue dealers, but argue that these are tasks for
which law enforcement agencies are better equipped than private business
firms. 38 From the industry's perspective, promulgating retail sales prac-
tices and providing training would be redundant given the existence of
extensive Federal and state regulations governing firearms sales and dealer
licensing.3 9 Distributing only to franchised retail outlets would drastically
restrict sales.4 0 Termination of supply contracts with rogue dealers would
be unnecessary if state agencies like the BATF would properly police gun
dealers as they are mandated to do. Furthermore, defendants have argued
31. See Charles Schumer, A Few Bad Apples: Small Number of Gun Dealers the Source of Most
Crimes, (visited July 14, 1999) <www.senate.gov/-schumer/html/a few badcapples.him> (on file with
the author); see also Fox Butterfield, Gun Flow to Criminals Laid to 7ny Fraction of Dcalers, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 1999, at A14 (detailing the relatively few dealers who deal in guns used to commit
crimes).
32. See Schumer, supra, note 31.
33. See id.
34. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp.2d 802, 821-33 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
35. See Complaint (Award) at I 4(e),.City of Chicago v. Beretta U.SA. Corp., No. 99-2518 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. Cook County filed Nov. 12, 1998).
36. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 831-32.
37. See Complaint (Award) at 4, Chicago (No. 99-2518), Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 832.
38. See, e.g., Trial Transcript of Feb. 3, 1999, at 3829-3837, 3909, Hamilton v. Accu-Tck, 62 F.
Supp.2d 802 (No. CV-95-0049) (E.D.N.Y. 1999) [hereinafler Hamilton Trial Transcript] (on file with
the author).
39. See SPORTING ARMS AND AMMUNTION MANUFACTURERS' INSTITUTE, NON-FICTION
WtTER's GUIDE: A WRITER'S RESOURCE TO FIREARMS AND AMMUNTION 12 (1998). Industry lit-
erature estimates that there are already some 20,000 Federal, state and local regulations governing
firearms sales. See id
40. See Hamilton Trial Transcript, supra note 38, at 3908.
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that attempting to identify and sanction rogue dealers would interfere with
sensitive law enforcement attempts to infiltrate and shut down organized
gun trafficking operations.4 '
2. Compulsory installation of safety features
In addition to advocating manufacturer supervision of retail sales,
plaintiffs have also demanded that gun manufacturers install safety features
that would "personalize" guns, rendering them inoperable in the hands of
unauthorized users.2 Plaintiffs have pointed out that mechanical locking
devices built into the gun itself have been feasible since first patented in
1976. 3 Today many different designs for locking devices, both combina-
tion and key-operated, exist. 4 In addition, plaintiffs have called for further
development of electronic locking devices that would allow a gun to fire
only upon recognition of an authorized user. In one version of this "smart
gun" technology, a microchip in the gun stores images of the authorized
users' fingerprints and fires only when it recognizes the fingerprints of the
person holding the gun. Another version involves a gun that fires only
when it senses radio signals emitted by a special ring or lapel pin worn by
the individual holding the gun.45
According to plaintiffs, personalizing guns would have a significant
impact on gun violence. Locking devices would reduce the risk that chil-
dren who play with loaded guns would accidentally fire them or that indi-
viduals who steal guns would be able to use them to commit crimes 6 De-
fendants counter that locking devices may make it more difficult for
authorized users to fire a gun in an emergency, thereby reducing the effec-
tiveness of the gun for self-defense! 7 The time necessary to unlock a gun
could be the time it takes for an assailant to fire first or overpower the vic-
tim.
B. The doctrinal grounds for tort claims against the gun industry
By filing lawsuits, plaintiffs have introduced into the tort system the
policy debate over whether manufacturer supervision of retail gun sales
41. See it
42. See Complaint (Award) at 4, Chicago (No. 99-2518); Fust Amended Complaint at 12, Dix
v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 750681-9 (Cal. Super. Ct. County ofAlameda filed Apr. 15, 1998).
43. See Siebel, supra note 1, at Part IILC.
44. See Maijorie Sessions, Gun Locks: Key to Future Sales?, 17 SHOOTR;G SPORTS RETALER,
July/Aug. 1999, at 16; Ron Spomer, Locked and Loaded, POPuLAR MEcmAICs, Sept. 1998, at 88.
45. See Anne Eisenberg, Smart Guns Can Check Identities Before Firing, N.Y. TIMaS, Sept 10,
1998, at 63; William Greider, Will the Smart Gun Save Lives?, ROI.ING STONE, Aug. 6, 1998, at 36;
Amanda Ripley, Ready. Aim. Enter Your Pin, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Nov. 21, 1999, at 82; Leslie
Wayne, Smart Guns Prove to be no Quick Fix for Firearm Violence, N.Y. TIMMS, June 15, 1999, at
A24.
46. See Siebel, supra note 1, at Part IH.C.
47. See generally Kleck, Guns Aren't Ready, supra note 2.
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and compulsory installation of safety features would be fair and effective
ways to reduce gun violence. Plaintiffs aiming to pressure manufacturers
to supervise retail gun sales have sued based on negligent marketing and
public nuisance doctrines, while plaintiffs seeking to compel gun makers to
install safety devices have sued based on strict liability for design defect.
48
Negligent marketing claims allege that manufacturers are careless in
promoting, distributing and selling their weapons in ways that unreasona-
bly increase the risk that the weapons will be used to commit crimes. For
example, in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek,49 seven mothers of shooting victims
sued twenty-five gun manufacturers alleging that the defendants negli-
gently oversupplied guns to retail dealers in states with weak gun laws,
creating a pool of available guns for illegal gun trafficking to states with
strict gun laws, where the guns were subsequently used in crimes.50 Ac-
cording to the plaintiffs, liability for negligent marketing would provide
gun manufacturers an incentive to adopt reasonable sales restrictions that
would reduce the risk of illegal gun trafficking and resulting crimes. These
restrictions include franchising retail outlets to more closely monitor sales
and maintain appropriate supply levels.51 The jury found in favor of one of
the seven plaintiffs, and the case is currently on appeal.52
Closely related to negligent marketing claims, public nuisance claims
allege that manufacturers promote, distribute and sell their weapons in
ways that unreasonably interfere with a right common to the general pub-
lic. For example, in City of Chicago v. Baretta, the city of Chicago sued
gun manufacturers alleging that by narketing handguns through suburban
gun stores, the defendants knowingly facilitate the sale of guns to Chicago
residents whose possession of them within city limits violates city ordi-
nances and whose misuse of them to commit crimes interferes with the
health and safety of the public.53 In this case, the city of Chicago is seek-
ing not only money damages to compensate for the emergency-service and
law-enforcement costs resulting from gun violence, but is also seeking an
injunction that would force gun manufacturers to terminate supply con-
tracts with dealers who repeatedly sell to Chicago residents guns that are
traced to crime.5 4 The City of Chicago case is currently in the pretrial
48. For a detailed doctrinal and policy analysis of these claims, see Timothy Lytton, Tort Claims
Against Gun Manufacturers for Crime-Related Injuries: Defining a Suitable Role for the Tort System In
Regulating the Firearms Indstry, 65 Mo. L. REv. (forthcoming 2000).
49. 62 F. Supp.2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
50. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 808. For a discussion of the Hamilton case and other negligent
marketing claims against gun manufacturers, see Lytton, supra note 49, at Part BI.C.
51. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 831.
52. See id at 808.
53. See Complaint at 23, City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98 CH 15596 011. App. Ct.
Cook County filed Nov. 12, 1998). For a discussion of City of Chicago v. Beretta U.SA. Corp., see
Lytton, supra note 49, at Part II.D.
54. See Complaint (Award) at 4, Chicago (No. 98 CH 15596).
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phase.
Design defect claims allege that guns lacking locking devices are de-
fective products. For example, in Dix v. Baretta, a fourteen-year-old child,
accidentally shot by a friend who was playing with a pistol that he did not
know was loaded, sued the manufacturer of the gun alleging that the gun
was defectively designed since it lacked a built-in safety lock and a load
indicator that would have alerted the friend that the gun was loaded. 5
Similarly, in Morial v. Smith & Wesson,56 the city of New Orleans sued
gun manufacturers alleging that their sale of guns without locking devices
and load indicators subjected the defendants to strict liability for the mu-
nicipal costs associated with gun violence!Y The jury in Dix found for the
defendants58 The Morial case is currently in the pretrial phase.
C. Parties
The doctrines of negligent marketing, public nuisance, and strict liabil-
ity for design defect have allowed plaintiffs to use the tort system as a fo-
rum in which to conduct policy debates over whether manufacturer super-
vision of retail sales and compulsory installation of safety mechanisms
would be fair and effective ways to reduce gun violence. 9 Within the tort
system, a variety of players-parties, judges, and juries--exercise policy-
making powers that influence the outcome of these debates. I analyze how
each of these players contributes to making policy within the tort system,
beginning with parties. I focus on two ways in which parties have influ-
enced gun-violence policy in lawsuits against the gun industry: first, by
means of settlement negotiations that have produced changes in regulation
of the industry and second, by means of public discourse that has refrained
debate over gun-violence policy.
Parties resolve most lawsuits by negotiating a settlement.o Settlement
allows parties to resolve their dispute in a way that avoids the high costs
55. See Complaint at 1W 11-12, Dix v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 750681-9 (Cal. Super. CL County
of Alameda filed Apr. 15, 1998). For a discussion of design defect claims against gun manukcturers,
see Lytton, supra note 48, at Part 1LB.
56. No. 98-18578 (La. Civ. Dist CL Parish ofOrleans filed Oct. 30, 1998).
57. See Complaint at 'W 2-7, Morial v. Smith & Wesson, No. 98-18578 (La. Civ. Dist. CL Parish of
Orleans filed Oct. 30, 1998).
58. See Jwy Fnds Gun Maker Not Liable for Death of CA Boy, 9 ANDREWS LrTG. Rp, t 6
(1998).
59. Plaintiffs have also sued based on other theories, such as deceptive trade practices and strict
liability for abnormally dangerous activities, in order to conduct similar policy debates about other
proposals concerning promotion and advertising as well as sales levels. See, eg., Copier v. Smith &
Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding defendant strictly liable for abnormally danger-
ous activity); Complaint at W 3-4, Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. CV 99 361279-S (Conn.
Super. Ct. Fairfield County filed Feb. 5, 1999) (alleging deceptive trade practices). For a discuion of
these claims, see Lytton, supm note 48, at Part IA.
60. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion ar.d Regulation of
Settlements, 46 STAN. L REv. 1339, 1339-40 (1994).
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and uncertainties of litigation. For this reason, parties usually prefer to
settle.
This has not been the case, however, in lawsuits against the gun indus-
try.61 The industry has for the most part resisted settlement, perhaps fear-
ing that settlement would be a sign of weakness that could encourage a
flood of claims against it by thousands of victims of gun violence. 62 Rather
than settling, most gun manufacturers have gambled that they could defeat
plaintiffs in court, either by having the claims against them dismissed prior
to trial or by obtaining favorable jury verdicts. So far, the gamble has paid
off. The overwhelming majority of claims have been dismissed prior to
trial, and of the few that have been tried, plaintiffs have obtained a favor-
able jury verdict in only one, the Hamilton63 case, which is currently on
appeal.
The recent entry of municipal plaintiffs into gun litigation has softened
the .industry's resistance to settlement. Plaintiffs in litigation against gun
manufacturers have traditionally been individual gunshot victims or their
representatives. In the fall of 1998, the City of New Orleans filed the first
municipal lawsuit against a group of manufacturers." Shortly thereafter,
Chicago and Bridgeport filed similar lawsuits, followed by Miami, Atlanta,
Boston, Washington, D.C., Cleveland, St. Louis, Newark, Los Angeles and
San Francisco. 65 To date, twenty-nine cities have filed lawsuits against the
gun industry.66 For the most part, these municipal lawsuits are based on
the same theories of recovery as those brought by private plaintiffs.67 Un-
like private plaintiffs, however, cities can invest far more resources into
litigation and demand far higher damages based on the costs of law en-
forcement and emergency services required to address gun violence.
The potentially devastating costs of simultaneously defending against
so many municipal suits has motivated several major gun manufacturers to
enter into settlement negotiations with city attorneys. These negotiations
have reportedly focused on industry acceptance of voluntary marketing
restrictions and design modifications in exchange for the cities dropping
61. This does not include traditional product liability claims where the gun malfunctioned.
62. Cf Peter Schuck, Judicial Avoidance of Juries In Mass Tort Litigation, 48 DEPAUL L. REV.
479,482-87 (1998).
63. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
64. See Paul M. Barrett, As Lawsuits Loom, Gun Industry Presents a Fragmented Front, WALL. ST.
J., Dec. 9, 1998, atAl.
65. See Fox Butterfield, Suits Hold Microscope Over Gun Makers, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1999, at
A14; Vanessa O'Connell, Cleveland Becomes Sixth City to Sue a Group of Gun Makers, WVALL ST. J.,
April 9, 1999, at B3; Mark Schlinkman, St. Louis Files Lawsuit Against 27 Defendants in Gun Industry,
ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, May 1, 1999, at 8. See also Firearms Litigation Clearinghouse, Firearms
Litigation: Current Cases (visited Apr. 6, 1999) <http'//www.firearnslitigation.org /cases/html>
[hereinafter Firearms Litigation].
66. See Firearms Litigation, supra note 65.
67. See Lytton, supra note 48, at Part lIl.C.
their demands for monetary damages.68 Settlement according to these
terms would allow the municipal plaintiffs to achieve their policy goals
while providing the industry with a way to avoid enormous litigation costs
and the risk of damaging jury verdicts.
So far, only one manufacturer, Smith & Wesson, has actually signed a
settlement.69 Under its terms, Smith & Wesson agreed to establish a "code
of conduct" that requires its authorized retail dealers to accept voluntary
sales restrictions designed to decrease illegal purchases. Smith & Wesson
also agreed to sell all its handguns with mechanical trigger locks and to
develop a marketable smart gun within three years. In return, most cities
agreed to drop their claims and the attorneys general of New York and
Connecticut agreed not to file lawsuits against the company in the future.
The Clinton administration, which helped to shape the settlement, prom-
ised not to name the company in a threatened suit against the industry by
the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD").
The administration also indicated that it would encourage federal and state
law enforcement agencies to purchase Smith & Wesson firearms.3
Other gun manufacturers have denounced the Smith & Wesson settle-
ment, and retail dealers have called for a boycott of the company's prod-
ucts. The National Shooting Sports Foundation ('NSSF'), an industry
trade group, criticized Smith & Wesson for breaking rank with other manu-
facturers to "run off and cut their own deal." ' "The decision by foreign
owned handgun manufacturer Smith & Wesson to forge an agreement with
the most anti-gun administration in our nation's history has violated a trust
with their customers and with the entire firearms industry." In opposition
to the settlement, one of the nation's largest gun wholesalers announced
that it would stop distributing Smith & Wesson handguns and many retail
dealers now refuse to sell the company's products. 3 In response, the attor-
neys general of New York and Connecticut are investigating the industry to
determine whether these efforts to promote a boycott constitute an antitrust
violation7 Firing back, the NSSF and several manufacturers filed suit
against the Secretary of HUD, the attorneys general of New York and
Connecticut, and 16 local governments claiming that their attempts to
adopt purchasing agreements favoring companies that accept the terms of
68. See Fox Butterfield, Sfety and Crime at the Heart of Talks on Gun Lawsuits, N.Y. TIwES, Oct.
2,1999, at Al.
69. See James Dao, Under Legal Siege, Gun Maker Agrees to Accept Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
2000, atAl [hereinafter Dao, Under Legal Siege].
70. See Fox Butterfield, Gun Maker's Accord on Curbs Brings Pressure from Industry, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 30,2000, at Al [hereinafter Butterfield, Gun Maker 'sAccora].
71. Leslie Wayne, Gun Makers See Betrayal in Decision by Smith & Wesson, N.Y. TIMSi, Iar. 18,
2000, at A8.
72. Id.
73. See Butterfield, Gun Maker'sAccord, stupra note 70, atAl.
74. See id.
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the Smith & Wesson settlement constitute an unconstitutional interference
with interstate commerce.75 In this highly adversarial atmosphere, pros-
pects for additional settlements are unclear 6
Many commentators have pointed to the recent settlement between
state attorneys general and the tobacco industry as a model for settlement
negotiations between city attorneys and gun manufacturers. While the
tobacco settlement provides an example of how well-coordinated litigation
can force a powerful industry to the bargaining table, more importantly it
reveals how a successful litigation strategy can result in a disappointing
policy outcome. The tobacco settlement, which includes annual payments
by tobacco manufacturers to states for twenty-five years in exchange for an
end to litigation by the states and any local government entities, has so far
done little to help, and may in fact hinder, tobacco control policy.78
Greed among plaintiffs' lawyers, lack of coordination among state
officials, and intensive lobbying efforts by the tobacco industry have di-
verted most of the settlement money from tobacco control toward unprece-
dented attorneys' fees and unrelated public works projects.79 Even worse,
the substantial income that states will receive from the tobacco settlement
gives them reason to oppose future regulatory measures aimed at tobacco
control or private litigation against tobacco companies that might interfere
with the industry's ability to make its annual payments. 80 These results of
the tobacco settlement should serve as a warning to municipal plaintiffs in
lawsuits against the gun industry to keep focused on their policy goals and
view litigation as merely a means to those ends. That there is relatively
little money at stake in the gun litigation will make it easier to avoid the
problems illustrated by the tobacco settlement.8'
Overemphasis on settlement may obscure another significant way in
75. See James Dao, Gun Makers Sue Governments on Buying Rules, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 27,2000, at
A18.
76. Both the government's enthusiasm for and the industry's denounciations of the settlement seem
surprising in view of the fact that prior to the agreement Smith & Wesson had already promulgated a
code of conduct for retail dealers, was already equipping all of its handguns with trigger locks, and had
been working to develop smart gun technology for some time. David B. Ottoway & Barbara Vobejda,
Gun Manufacturer Requires Dealers to Sign Code of Ethics, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1999, at A 1; Dao,
Under Legal Siege, supra note 69, at A1.
77. See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, Jumping the Gun?: Attacks on Firewa Echo Earlier Assaults on
Tobacco Industy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1999, at Al; Fox Butterfield, Results in Tobacco Litigation
Spur Cities to File Gun Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,1998, at Al.
78. See Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Citizens, Governments, and Injurious Industries, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000).
79. See Scott Harshbarger, Comments at Northeastern University Law School, 15th Tobacco Prod-
ucts Liability Conference: From Tobacco to Firearms: Lessons for Litigators (May 25, 1999); David
Stout, Few States are Using Settlements in Tobacco Suit to Cut Smoking, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 25, 1999,
at A12; Dagan & White, supra note 78, at Part I.C.1.
80. See Dagan & White, supra note 78, at Part I.C.l.
81. The annual sales of gun manufacturers totals amere $1.4 billion compared to $45 billion for the
tobacco industry. See Barrett, supra note 64.
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which parties play a role in policymaking. Scholars have distinguished
between two distinct effects that litigation can have on public policy. First,
litigation can have "instrumental" effects, creating legal sanctions or in-
centives that regulate behavior.82 For example, settlement negotiations
between city attorneys and gun manufacturers may create sanctions that
would apply to manufacturers who fail to restrict their sales and incentives
for manufacturers to develop smart gun technology. Second, litigation can
have "constitutive" effects, giving rise to new interpretations of an old
problem and reshaping the terms of debate about it.' For example, by
highlighting the claims of gunshot victims and the social costs of gun vio-
lence, lawsuits against the gun industry may reframe the debate over gun-
violence policy by downplaying disagreement over the right to bear arms
and highlighting concern for public safety.
The potential of plaintiffs to reframe the debate over gun-violence
owes agreat deal to a highly publicized massacre at a suburban high school
in Littleton, Colorado, in the spring of 1999, carried out by two students
armed with guns. The Littleton incident elevated the problem of gun vio-
lence to the top of the national political agenda' 4 Throughout the 1980s
and most of the 1990s, gun violence had been viewed as an urban crime
problem primarily among African American boys. Talk of ineducable "su-
per predator" juvenile criminals became fashionable among criminologists,
and calls for stiffer juvenile sentencing and more prisons were common
responses to gun violence8 5 The Littleton massacre, following similar
shootings at schools in Pearl, Mississippi and West Paducah, Kentucky in
82. See Lynn Mather, Theorizing about Trial Courts: LaWyer, Pollcy naklng and Tobacco Litiga-
tion, 23 LAW& Soc. INQUIRY 897,900 (1998).
83. See idL at 900.
84. See Katherine Q. Seelye, Clinton Asks Hunters to Back JIb Proposals Curbing Guns, N.Y.
Tams, Apr. 28, 1999, at A26; Sam !. Verhovek, 2 Are Suspects: Delay Caused by Explos-ives, N.Y.
TMES, Apr. 22,1999, at Al.
85. For discussions about "super-predator" juvenile criminals, see FRANK ZMmUG, ALIERC.
YoUTH VIOLENCE 49-181 (1998) (analyzing the rhetorical alms of those who use the term "super-
predator" in youth violence studies); Elizabeth Joh, "IfIt Suffices to Accuse:" United States v. Watts
andthe Reassessment of.Acquittals, 74 N.Y.U. L REV. 887, 891 (1999) (discussing the use ofthe term
"super-predator" in criminal sentencing classifications); John Dilulio, Jr., Moral Poverty: 77l Coming
of the Super-Predators Should Scare us into Wanting to Get to tL Root Causes of Crinme a Lot Faster,
Cm. TREB, Dec. 15, 1995, at31 (coining the term "super-predalor" to denote juvenile criminals); For
examples of proposals for stiffer criminal sentencing in response to youth violence, sce S)7rposumn on
the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime: Foreward Remarks by Governor James R.
Thompson on the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime, 73 J. CRm. L & CRPmINOIGY
867, 868-69 (1982); Karl Zinsmeister, Growing Up Scared: Spurred on by Family Instability, Violent
Crime Now Touches Millions of Young Lives, 265 ATL MONTHLY 49 (June 1990); The Erany Within:
Violent Youth Prey Upon the Innocent, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRID., Dec. 2, 1993, a B12, available in
LEXIS, News Libray, Sdut File; Roger Starr, Crime: How It Dzstrcys What Can Be Done, N.Y.
TWEs, Jan. 27, 1985, at 19; Symington on Crime: Tour de Force Proposals, PHOENx GAZEr Nov.
3, 1993, at B6; Top Police Officials Would Reply to Rise in Violent Crlme, CHIA SCi. MONITOR'.,
Apr. 2, 1981, at 6.
1997 and Springfield, Oregon and Jonesboro, Arkansas in 1998, trans-
formed public discourse about gun violence from a battle against urban
crime into a concern for child safety.86 In addition to the portrayal of gun
violence as a child safety issue, social scientists in the late 1990s began to
describe it as a public health problem, emphasizing injury prevention rather
than punishment.87 These social scientists have drawn attention to acci-
dental shootings resulting from children playing with guns, as well as in-
tentional shootings.
In the context of this new focus on child safety and injury prevention
rather than criminal conduct, plaintiffs in lawsuits against the gun industry
have cast gun makers rather than criminals or children as the cause of gun
violence. Plaintiffs allege that irresponsible marketing practices are a sig-
nificant source of guns used in crime and that the failure to equip guns with
safety features accounts for many accidental injuries.88 Plaintiffs are using
discovery to substantiate these claims by uncovering new information
about the highly secretive gun industry. In the Hamilton case, the plaintiffs
obtained an affidavit from a former Smith & Wesson Senior Vice President
of Marketing and Sales who stated that:
The company and the industry as a whole are fully aware of the
extent of criminal misuse of firearms. The company and the indus-
try are also aware that the black market in firearms is not simply
the result of stolen guns but is due to the seepage of guns into the
illicit market from multiple thousands of unsupervised federal fire-
arms licensees. In spite of their knowledge, however, the indus-
try's position has consistently been to take no independent action
to insure [sic] responsible distribution practices ....
Plaintiffs demand greater industry regulation, further supporting the view
that the gun industry is responsible for gun violence.90 Whether or not
86. See Frank Bruni, Mother Love: Democrats Try Pitching to Maternal Instincts, N.Y. TIMES, July
4, 1999, at 5; Alison Mitchell, Democrats Gain Ground, An Inch, On Gun Control, N.Y. TIME, May
21, 1999, at A23; Alison Mitchell & Frank Bnmi, Suburban Districts Seen as Key In the Debate over
Gun Control, N.Y. TIMs, June 16, 1999, at AI; John O'Neil, Vital Signs: Safety: When Children and
Guns Live Together, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1999, at E8; Other Shootings Involving Students, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 21, 1999, at A17.
87. See, e.g., Thomas B. Cole, et. al., What Can We Do About Violence?, 282 JAMA 481 (1999);
Garen J. Wintemute, The Future of Firearms Violence Prevention, 282 JAMA 475 (1999) (viewing
injury resulting from gun violence as a public health problem).
88. See Siebel, supra note 1, at Part mI.C.
89. Affidavit of Robert I. Haas at U 20-21, Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp, 1307 (E.D.N.Y.
1996) No. 95-CV-0049, cited in David Kairys, Legal Claims of Cities Against the Manufacturers of
Handguns, 71 TEMLEL. REv. 1, 7 (1998).
90. See, e.g., Complaint (Award) at 4, City of Chicago v. Baretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98 CH 15596
(Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County filed Nov. 12, 1998) (asking the court to, inter alia, prohibit the sale of Illegal
firearms to Chicago residents, prohibit gun dealers from selling firearms to individuals who have pur-
chased a firearm within the previous thirty days).
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plaintiffs ultimately prevail in individual cases, their litigation strategy may
significantly change views about gun violence and reframe the debate over
how best to address it.
Plaintiffs have not been alone in attempting to shape the terms of de-
bate over gun-violence policy. The gun industry has portrayed the munici-
pal plaintiffs' attempt to pressure gun manufacturers into a settlement by
filing simultaneous lawsuits as a kind of blackmail, a misuse of legal proc-
ess by mayors bent on achieving gun control measures that they were pow-
erless to obtain in their own city and state legislatures.9 ' With the help of
the NRA, the industry has lobbied state legislatures to pass legislation pro-
hibiting cities from bringing tort claims against gun manufacturers.9 So
far, these efforts have been successful in thirteen states, including Texas,
Georgia and Louisiana.93 In these states, the gun industry has successfully
recast gun litigation from an attempt to address the problem of gun vio-
lence to a cynical abuse of the tort system designed to circumvent the leg-
islative process.
Having analyzed how parties in the tort system influence policymaking
by negotiating settlements and shaping the terms of debate, it is important
to point out two dangers of relying on parties to make gun-violence policy.
First, settlement agreements suffer from the same problem of gaps as pro-
spective regulation by legislatures. Such agreements can never anticipate
all future situations and they provide both parties opportunities to circum-
vent the spirit of the accord while sticking to the letter of it. For example, a
week after it settled, Smith & Wesson published a "clarification" of the
settlement agreement, offering an interpretation that excludes many of the
sales restrictions originally announced by the plaintiffsm Moreover, any
future settlement agreement between the cities and current members of the
gun industry cannot bind new manufacturers who enter into the market
after the litigation ends or old manufacturers who close down and start up
again under a new name.
Second, there is a danger that plaintiffs' and defendants' success in
influencing policymaking could undermine the integrity of the tort system.
The extent to which plaintiffs' ability to force manufacturers into settle-
91. See The President's Column, AK. RImn!AN, April 1999, at 12. There is reason to belicev that
much of the public agrees with this portrayal of the current wave of gun litigation. A January 1999
survey found that 66% of respondents opposed government suits against gun makers and only 19o
supported such efforts, with 15% unsure. See Barrett, supra note 64.
92. See Fox Butterfield, Verdict Against Gun fakers Is Likly to Prompt More Suits, N.Y. 7I'tES,
Feb. 13, 1999, at B2; Rebecca Carr, Barr's Bill on Gun Suits Dras Opposition, ATLArA J. &
CONST., Mar. 10, 1999, at A4; David E. Rosenbaum, Echoes of Tobacco Battle In Gun Suits, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 21, 1999, at 32.
93. For a complete list of such legislation, see Fireanrs Industy Legislatlon (visited Apr. 12,
1999) <http-/www.gunfree.org>.
94. See Fox Butterfield & Marc Lacey, Biggest Gunmaker Revises the Rules of Pact with U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14,2000, atAl.
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ment talks and to publicize their views about gun violence is based on the
threat of litigation costs lends credibility to the charge that their strategy
amounts to a form of blackmail. This could ignite a public backlash
against the tort system and erode public confidence in the courts. The suc-
cess of industry efforts to obtain legislative immunity from municipal law-
suits also threatens to undermine the integrity of the tort system, determin-
ing liability on the basis of political muscle rather than judicial procedure.
D. Judges
Judges have the power to make policy by ruling in ways that determine
the outcome of litigation. Judges in lawsuits against the gun industry have
frequently exercised this power by granting defense motions to dismiss and
motions for summary judgment, thereby rejecting plaintiffs' policy propos-
als.95 Judges could, in future cases, rule in favor of plaintiffs, thereby sup-
porting their policy proposals.
In negligent marketing cases involving proposals for manufacturer
supervision of retail sales, judges have the power to accept or reject these
proposals by framing the issue of duty in specific terms. Judges can alter-
natively leave this determination to the jury by framing the issue of duty in
general terms. In order for a plaintiff to prevail in a negligent marketing
cases, he must establish that the defendant owed him a duty, breached that
duty, and that this breach of duty was a proximate cause of his injuries.96
95. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 843
F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988); Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1986); Shipman v.
Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532 (l1th. Cir. 1986); Perkins v. F.LE. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th
Cir. 1985); Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984); Bubalo v.
Navegar, Inc., No. 96-C-3664, 1998 WL 142359 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 1998); McCarthy v. Sturm, Rugcr
& Co., Inc., 916 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Caveny v. Raven Arms, Co., 665 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.
Ohio 1987); Mavilia v. Stoeger Indus., 574 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mass. 1983); Adklnson v. Rossi Arms
Co., 659 P.2d 1236 (Alaska 1983); First Commercial Trust Co. v. Lorcin Eng'g, Inc., 900 SW.2d 202
(Ark. 1995); Delahanty v. Hinkley, 564 A.2d 758 (D.C. 1989); Coulson v. DeAngelo, 493 So. 2d 98
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Trespalacios v. Valor Corp., 486 So. 2d 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986);
Rhodes v. R.G. Indus., 325 S.E.2d 465 (Ga. App. 1984); Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 477
N.E.2d 1293 (11. App. Ct. 1985); Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 469 N.E.2d 339 (Ill. App. CL 1984);
Strickland v. Fowler, 499 So. 2d 199 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Restelner v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 566
N.W.2d 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); King v. R.G. Indus., 451 N.W.2d 874 (Mich. CL App. 1989);
Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Fomi v. Ferguson, 232 A.D.2d 176
(N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 704 P.2d 118 (Or. 1985); Knott v. Liberty
Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 748 P.2d 661 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
Cases that were not dismissed prior to trial include Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp.2d 802
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (jury verdict for one of nine plaintiffs, currently on appeal), Halberstam v. Daniel, No.
95 Civ. 3323 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (jury verdict against plaintiffs), and Kelly v. RG. Indus., 497 A.2d 1143
(Md. 1985) (abandoned by plaintiffs). For more on Kelly, see Howard L. Siegel, Winning Without
Precedent: Kelly v. R.G. Industries, 14 No. 4 Litigation 32 (1988). For more on Halbertam, see
Timothy D. Lytton, Halberstam v. Daniel and the Uncertain Future of Negligent Marketing Claims
Against Forearms Manufacturers, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 681 (1998); Lytton, supra note 48, at Part II.C.4
& 5.
96. See, e.g., Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 818.
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The question of whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty is a matter
of law for the judge to decide, while the question of whether the defendant
breached this duty is a matter of fact for the jury to decide.97
By framing the duty in question in general terms, judges make it easier
to rule that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty and to submit the ques-
tion of whether the defendant breached that duty to the jury. Consider the
example of a negligent marketing claim where a shooting victim alleges
that a gun manufacturer was negligent in failing to terminate its supply
contract with a dealer who sold over a hundred guns traced to crime in each
of the last two years. Suppose the defendant moves for dismissal of the
case arguing that it should not be found liable because it owed the plaintiff
no duty of care. Were the judge in such a case to frame the duty in ques-
tion as the duty to exercise reasonable care, it would be easy to rule against
the defendant, holding that the gun manufacturer owed the plaintiff a duty
to exercise reasonable care. This would leave for the jury (as an issue of
breach) the question of whether the defendant's failure to terminate the
supply contract was unreasonable. Justification of imposing a duty to ex-
ercise reasonable care on a defendant requires little more than mention of
the generally accepted principle that all persons owe foreseeable victims a
duty to exercise reasonable care.98
By framing the duty in question in specific terms, however, judges can
themselves determine the ultimate issue of liability. 9 Were the judge in
our example to frame the duty in question as a duty to terminate supply
contracts with irresponsible dealers, there would be little or nothing left for
the jury to decide. The judge might rule that there is no such duty, thereby
dismissing the case. Alternatively, the judge might rule that there is such a
duty, leaving only the question of whether the defendant in fact failed to
terminate the supply contract, a fact that would most likely be admitted by
the defendant. Thus, the judge's duty analysis, carried out in the context of
ruling on a motion to dismiss, would determine the ultimate issue of liabil-
ity as a matter of law.
Duty analysis in negligent marketing cases is often complicated by the
added difficulty of imposing a duty on gun manufacturers to protect vic-
tims from third parties, either careless retail sellers or criminal assailants.
The imposition of such a duty requires that the plaintiff establish a special
relationship between the gun manufacturer and either the third party or the
victim that makes the gun manufacturer uniquely situated to prevent the
injury.10 Judges have argued both in favor of and against the existence of
97. See id at 818, 828; see also IV. PAGE KEETON, ET AL, PRossER & KEEao, O4 TORTS § 37
(5th ed. 1984).
98. See RESTAmiENT (tHIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PICIPLES § 6 cmL. a. (Discussion Dmft
1999).
99. See id. cmL. h.
100. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 820; KEON ErAL., sVura note 97, § 53, at 838.
such a special relationship.' 0 '
In the overwhelming majority of negligent marketing claims, judges
have framed the duty in question narrowly, ruled in favor of defendants,
and dismissed the claims.1 02 For example, in Riordan v. International Ar-
mament Corp.,l03 the plaintiffs were shot with handguns while being
criminally assaulted1 °4 They alleged that given
the large number of injuries and deaths resulting from the use of
handguns to commit crime, criminal misuse was foreseeable and
the defendant[s], handgun manufacturers and distributors[,] were
negligent in marketing [their] handguns to the general public with-
out taking adequate precautions to prevent the sale of [their] hand-
guns to persons who were reasonably likely to cause harm to the
general public. Plaintiffs claim that the defendant[s] ... had a duty
to' determine whether [their] retailers had taken all reasonable
measures to screen prospective purchasers and a duty to terminate
sales to those retailers the defendants knew or had reason to know
had a history of sales to persons who had used [their] handguns in
crime.105
The Riordan court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs'
negligence claim holding that "no common law duty exists upon a manu-
facturer of a nondefective handgun to control the distribution of that prod-
uct to the general public."'1°6 By framing the duty narrowly, as a duty to
control the distribution of guns, the court rejected the plaintiffs' proposal
for gun manufacturer supervision of retail sales. Had the court accepted
this duty, it would have supported the plaintiffs' proposal, since the defen-
dants could have defeated liability only by showing that they in fact super-
vised retail sales. The court could have left the policy decision to the jury
by framing the duty generally as a duty to exercise reasonable care, refus-
ing to dismiss the case, and leaving the jury to determine whether reason-
able care requires manufacturer supervision of retail sales.
In design defect claims involving proposals to develop safety features
for guns, judges have the power to support or reject these proposals by
varying the standard by which courts evaluate the safety of a particular gun
design. In order to prevail on a design defect claim, a plaintiff must estab-
lish that the product was sold in a "defective condition unreasonably dan-
101. See, e.g., Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 469 N.E.2d 339, 340 (i1l. App. Ct. 1984) (finding no
duty); Hamilton, 935 F. Supp. at 827 (finding a duty).
102. See supra note 95 (collecting various cases that illustrate this phenomenon).
103. 477 N.E.2d 1293 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
104. See id. at 1294.
105. Id. at 1295.
106. Id. (citing Linton, 469 N.E.2d at 340).
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gerous.' 0' 7 In gun cases, several courts have insisted that this doctrine re-
quires plaintiffs to establish first that the gun has a defect that caused it to
malfunction and second that the risks associated with the design outweigh
its utility.
1°8
For example, in Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, the mother of a store
clerk killed by a robber using a revolver sued the manufacturer."9 The
plaintiff alleged "that the handgun was 'defective and unreasonably dan-
gerous' in its design because handguns simply pose risks of injury and
death that 'far outweigh' any social utility that they may have."110 The
plaintiff admitted that the handgun did not malfunction in any way; indeed,
it functioned precisely as designed and as the robber expected."' The
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment against the
plaintiff, explaining that strict product liability for design defects applies
only to products that are defective in the sense that they malfunction and
unreasonably dangerous in the sense that the risks associated with them
outweigh their utility. The court held that "[w]ithout this essential predi-
cate, that something is wrong with the product, the risk/utility balancing
test does not even apply."' 12  Many courts have rejected design defect
claims by crime victims against gun manufacturers for failure to identify a
particular defective condition in the gun that caused 
it to malfunction." 3
In recent cases, plaintiffs have argued that they should be entitled to
recover under the doctrine of strict liability for design defect as long as
they can establish that there exists a reasonable alternative design that
would make a gun safer and that the failure to adopt this design makes the
gun unreasonably dangerous." 4  They allege that guns equipped with
locking devices present a reasonable alternative design, rendering guns
without such locks unreasonably dangerous.
15
In jurisdictions that require plaintiffs to establish that the gun malfunc-
tioned, the existence of a reasonable alternative design raises the question:
Does the misuse of a gun without a locking device constitute a malfunc-
tion? In accidental shooting cases, answering this question requires judges
to determine whether a properly functioning gun fires only when its user
107. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
108. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1272 (5th Cir. 1985); Patteron v. Gesc1sch-dfl
608 F. Supp. 1206, 1209-10 (N.D. Tex. 1985); Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751,753-54 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1988).
109. See Patterson 608 F. Supp. at 1208.
110. Id.
111. See d. at 1209.
112. Id at 1211.
113. See Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1272; Patterson, 608 F. Supp. at 1208; Rdchardion, 741 S.W.2d at
753-54.
114. See Complaint at 6, Morial v. Smith& Wesson Corp., No. 93-18578 (La. Civ. Dist. CL Parish
of Orleans filed Oct. 30, 1998).
115. See Complaint at 6, Morial (No. 98-18578).
intends it to fire. In criminal shooting cases, answering this question re-
quires judges to determine whether a properly functioning gun fires only
when fired by authorized users. Any answer to either of these questions
assumes a standard for evaluating gun designs based on what the judge
thinks the requirements of a properly functioning gun are, in particular
whether a locking device is an essential feature of a properly functioning
gun. Thus, in considering the issue of malfunction prior to any risk-utility
analysis by a jury, judges make policy choices about whether gun manu-
facturers ought to develop safer gun designs.
Policymaking within the context of doctrinal analysis is a well ac-
cepted feature of the judicial role.'1 6 For example, Prosser and Keeton
describe duty analysis in negligence cases as "an expression of the sum
total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the
plaintiff is entitled to protection."' 7 Similarly, doctrinal analysis in prod-
ucts liability since its inception has been driven by policy considerations
such as product safety and loss spreading."8
Judicial policymaking has advantages over policymaking by parties or
by juries. In comparison to parties, judges may be better representatives of
the public interest. Parties' attempts to make or influence public policy
may be heavily influenced by private concerns such as attorneys' fees,
reelection, product reputation, or industry profits and may exclude alto-
gether the interests of groups not represented in the litigation. Addition-
ally, policy that results from settlement negotiations between parties may
be more a reflection of the parties' relative bargaining power than a fair
balance of the competing interests at stake. While judges bring their own
personal perspectives and interests to doctrinal analysis, the judicial role
encourages them to look beyond merely the personal interests of the parties
and to attempt a fair balancing of the relevant policy considerations.
In comparison to juries, judges may provide more consistent policy
choices. Juries are encouraged to base their verdicts only on their views of
the particular case before them. By contrast, judges typically consider past
cases and often take them into account. While this does not guarantee uni-
formity of policy choices across jurisdictions, it does tend toward greater
consistency.
Judicial policymaking also has several shortcomings. While judges
may be more impartial than legislatures and less self-interested than par-
ties, they are limited by being able to act only in response to cases pre-
sented to them and only on the basis of information provided by
116. See generally, Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Producis
Liability, 60 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1995) (discussing the policymaking role of courts in products liability
cases).
117. KEETON ETAL., supra note 97, § 53, at 358.
118. SeeBogus, supranote 116, at 16.
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litigants.1 9 Policy choices are more likely to strike a fairer and more ef-
fective balance between competing interests when they are based on a
broad perspective and ample information, rather than the peculiarities of a
particular case before a judge and limited information provided by liti-
gants. Judicial insularity from political pressures creates a narrow per-
spective that may limit judges' effectiveness in policymaking.120
In addition, judges are less well equipped than legislatures to make
policy choices that rely on evaluation of complex and highly speculative
scientific data. Some claims against the gun industry, like the Hamilton
case, call upon judges to evaluate claims about the relation between par-
ticular marketing practices and the incidence of gun crimes, based on com-
plex econometric analysis and highly speculative expert opinion.' 2 ' In
order to strengthen their capacity to evaluate such evidence, the Federal
Rules of Evidence allow judges to appoint their own experts who can pres-
ent additional information or render opinions on evidence offered by the
parties.'2 Nevertheless, legislatures, unlike courts, can defer judgment
pending further investigation or legitimately make a policy decision based
on political grounds. Additionally, legislatures, in contrast to courts, are
democratically accountable for their mistakes.
E. Juries
Juries have the power to make policy by rendering verdicts that have
implications beyond a particular case. In lawsuits against the gun industry,
judges have submitted very few cases to juries. Nevertheless, these ver-
dicts can have great influence on gun-violence policy.
A jury finding that a particular marketing practice creates an unreason-
able risk of gun violence may discourage manufacturers throughout the
industry from engagingin that practice for fear of liability. The case of
Halberstam v. Daniel provides an example of how a jury verdict can
have industry-wide policy implications.2 4 The Halberstam case arose out
of a drive-by shooting involving a semi-automatic pistol, resulting in the
death of one victim and injury to another.'2 The pistol used in the attack
had been assembled from a mail-order parts kit manufacturer and sold by
the defendants. 126 The plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturer's marketing
scheme was negligent. In support of this claim, the plaintiffs pointed to the
defendant's sales methods which involved ordering by phone, postal deliv-
119. See KOMESAR, supra note 5, at 141-42.
120. See id. at 149-50.
121. See Lytton, supra note 48, atPartllCA.
122. See Howard Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEo. L J. 1983, 1986
(1999).
123. No. 95 Civ. 3323 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
124. See Lytton, supra note 18, at 686-98.
125. See ki. at 686.
126. See id at 686-88.
ery, reduced prices for bulk purchases, no requests for any information
other than that pertinent to payment and shipping, and failure to keep any
sales records. t2' By selling their weapons disassembled, in the form of
parts kits, the defendants avoided Federal and State regulations governing
the sale and possession of guns which, they argued, did not apply to the
sale of gun parts.128 While Federal law requires serial numbers on gun
frames, the defendants sold unmarked sheet metal flats that, when folded,
would serve as gun frames for the other parts that they sold.129 At trial, the
defendants testified that they did not care who purchased their weapons.
30
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, finding that
while the defendants' marketing practices were negligent, the defendants'
negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs' injuries. 131
At trial, the defendants had offered an affidavit and a deposition by the
criminal assailant in which he stated that he had purchased the gun used in
the attack from someone on the street, that he had never had any business
dealings with the defendants personally or by proxy, and that the defen-
dants did not cause him in any way to purchase firearms parts. 13 2 Despite
this finding of no causation, the Halberstam jury's finding of negligence
has been enough to end the practice of selling guns in the form of parts
kits.
Jury findings can also reject plaintiffs' policy proposals. For example,
a jury recently rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant in the design
defect case Dix v. Bareta133 In the Dix case, the judge asked the jury to
determine whether a pistol designed and manufactured without a locking
device or a load indicator was an unreasonably dangerous product. The
jury's verdict in favor of defendants rejected the plaintiff's policy proposal
to compel all manufacturers to equip guns with safety devices.
Entrusting policy choices to juries has several advantages. Juries, like
judges, are insulated from political pressures that sometimes distort legis-
lative policymaking. 3 4 Juries have the added advantage of being more
representative of the local community, which gives their verdicts greater
democratic legitimacy than judicial decisions.
There are also disadvantages to relying on juries to make policy.
While juries are more representative than judges, their perspective on a
problem is even more constrained. The information available to a jury is
127. See id. at 694-95.
128. See Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 5-7, Halberstam v. Daniel, No. 95
Civ. 3323 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
129. See Lytton, supra note 18, at 695.
130. See id.
131. See Id. at 697-98.
132. See Id. at 696.
133. See Jury Finds Gun Maker Not Liable for Death of CA Boy, supra note 58, at 6.
134. See KOMESAR, supranote 5, at 138-41.
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only a subset of what the parties and the judge have, limited not only by the
nature of the case before them and by what the parties choose to present to
them, but also by the rules of evidence that restrict what they are allowed
to hear.1 35 Juries lack an appreciation for how the case before them com-
pares to similar cases in the same and other jurisdictions. Juries also lack
the expertise concerning complex evidence that parties and judges acquire
as they build experience from case to case as litigation matures.
IV. SETTING LIMITS ON THE POLICYMAKING POWERS OF THE TORT
SYSTEM
In Part II, I advocated a complementary role for the tort system in gun-
violence policymaking. In Part I, I analyzed how different players in the
tort system-parties, judges, and juries-have influenced gun-violence
policymaking. Like all policymakers, these players each have particular
strengths and weaknesses. Their shortcomings make it important not to
rely too heavily on any one of them, or on the tort system as a whole, to
make gun-violence policy. While the tort system ought to play a role in
making gun-violence policy, it should be a limited one. I turn now to how
legislatures and courts set limits on the policymaking powers of the tort
system. Legislatures can pass laws preempting litigation before it occurs
as well as laws overturning judicial doctrines after cases are decided.
Judges can refuse to accept cases, leaving resolution of the underlying
policy issues to legislatures. Relying on legislatures and courts to manage
their own rivalry has obvious problems. The stability of this arrangement
relies on each institutions' respect for the policymaking efforts of the other.
A. Legislative preemption and overturning
Legislatures can limit the policymaking powers of the tort system by
passing laws that preempt plaintiffs from bringing certain kinds of claims
or by enacting statutory tort rules that overturn common law doctrines
made by judges. The case of Kelly v. RG. Industries137 provides an exam-
ple of how a legislature can overturn a doctrine. In Kelly, the wife of a
store clerk who was shot in the course of an armed robbery sued the manu-
facturer of the gun. 13 8 Although the case was eventually abandoned by the
plaintiff, the Supreme Court of Maryland created a new doctrine of strict
liability for the manufacture and sale of a Saturday Night Special which the
court defined as any cheap, easily concealable handgun "particularly at-
tractive for criminal use and virtually useless for the legitimate purposes of
135. See id
136. SeeJOSEPHSANDERS, BENDECTIONTRIAL A STUDYOF NIASs TORLITIGATION 158 (1998).
137. 497 A2d 1143 Qd. 1985).
138. See id. at 1144-45.
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law enforcement, sport, and protection.' 39  The court asserted that the
manufacture and sale of these guns posed an abnormally high risk of gun
violence. 141 Shortly following the Kelly decision, the Maryland legislature
overturned the doctrine of strict liability for the manufacture and sale of
Saturday Night Specials within the provisions of a gun control act that also
created a board of experts to identify and restrict the sale of handguns with
a high risk of criminal misuse.
141
There is an obvious problem with leaving the legislature in charge of
limiting the policymaking powers of the tort system. If the tort system
should be entrusted with making policy whenever the legislative process is
distorted by minority interest groups, these same groups may be behind
efforts to limit the policymaking power of the tort system. For example, in
many states, the gun industry and the NRA have successfully lobbied leg-
islatures to preempt litigation by passing laws that forbid lawsuits against
gun manufacturers brought by municipal plaintiffs based on negligent mar-
keting and defective design theories.'42 One bill even proposed making it a
crime to bring such a lawsuit.
143
B. Judicial deference to legislatures
Judges can limit the policymaking power of the tort system by refusing
to hear claims, thereby leaving determination of the underlying policy is-
sues to legislatures. For example, in Riordan v. International Armament
Corp.,144 the survivor of a man who died when he was shot with a gun
during a fight sued the gun manufacturer. 145 The court rejected the plain-
tiff's negligent marketing claim pointing out that "the distribution of fire-
arms is heavily regulated on both federal and state levels" and holding that
the imposition of a duty on gun manufacturers to exercise reasonable care
in marketing weapons was a legislative task.
146
There is an obvious problem with entrusting judges with the responsi-
bility of limiting the policymaking power of the tort system. Placing
judges in charge of limiting their own powers is not likely to inspire confi-
dence among those who view the tort system as already having gone too
139. Id. at 1153-54.
140. See id. at 1158-59.
141. See Monica Fennel, Note, Missing the Mark in Maryland: How Poor Drafting and Implemen-
tation Vitiated a Model State Gun Control Law, 13 HAIa1NEJ. PuB. L. & POL'Y 37,43-44 (1992).
142. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
143. Florida Senate Bill 1586 proposed that any municipal employee who, in his official capacity,
brought a lawsuit against a gun manufacturer alleging design defect in the absence of a malfunction or
negligent marketing would be guilty of committing a third degree felony. S.B. 1586, 1999 Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 1999). The Florida Senate ended consideration of this bill in April 1999, following the Llttleton
massacre.
144. 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1294 al. App. Ct. 1985).
145. See id. at 1294.
146. Id. (citing Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 469 N.E.2d 339,340 (II. App. Ct. 1984)).
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far. So far in lawsuits against the gun industry, mostjudges have either left
policy choices to legislatures or decided them in favor of defendants. If
plaintiffs begin to win cases, however, there may arise complaints about an
unrestrained judiciary. If this occurs, then legislatures may step in and
overrule judicial decisions.
The stability of the mechanisms that limit the policymaking power of
the tort system in the end depends not only on a balance of power between
legislatures and courts, but one that is imbued with a respect for the insti-
tutional integrity of the other. Legislatures and courts need each other, as
well as markets and administrative agencies, in order to make, administer
and enforce fair and effective public policy. They must work together as
partners, even in managing their rivalry.
V. CONCLUSION
Policymaking in the United States is a complex activity that involves a
variety of institutions including markets, legislatures, and administrative
agencies. In this Article, I have argued that the tort system ought to play a
complementary role in policymaking. I supported this claim by showing
how the tort system compensates for particular problems faced by these
other institutions, using gun-violence policymaking as an example. I then
analyzed how the tort system makes gun-violence policy, highlighting both
the strengths and weaknesses of parties, judges and juries as policymakers.
Finally, I showed how legislatures and courts can maintain limits on the
policymaking powers of the tort system, cautioning that their ability to
support an active but limited policymaking role for the tort system depends
not only on institutional arrangements but also on a culture of mutual re-
spect between different branches of government. My goal throughout has
been to add depth and detail to the controversy over the role of private liti-
gation in the making of public policy.

